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MINOR DRIVERS HELD TO THE ADULT
STANDARD OF CARE: NEUDECK V.
BRANSTEN (CAL. 1965)
As a general rule, the standard of care required of minors charged
with negligence has not been the adult standard of "a reasonable and
prudent man under similar circumstances." Taking into considera-
tion the obvious fact of a minor's immaturity and lack of experience,
the courts have imposed a far more limited standard of care com-
mensurate with the child's age, intelligence and experience under
like circumstances.'
However, with reference to a minor's use of certain powerful
and rather lethal instrumentalities such as an automobile, the wis-
dom of this rule has been increasingly questioned.
The "well settled" principle that a minor, although liable for his
negligence, need not have conducted himself with adult prudence and
circumspection but need have acted only as a reasonable person of his
age and experience would have under similar circumstances is in
serious question today insofar as its applicability to minor operators
of motor vehicles or other motor-powered devices is concerned. 2
In the recent case of Neudeck v. Bransten,8 the First District
Court of Appeal followed what might be termed the "modern rule""
by holding that an exception to the general rule arises when negli-
gence is attributed to a minor while he is operating a motor vehicle.
In this particular situation a minor is to be held to the adult stan-
dard of care.
We hold that when a minor engages in an activity such as driving,
which is normally undertaken by adults and for which adult qualifica-
tions are required, an exception to the general rule arises, and the
minor should be held to the ordinary standard of care. 5
In Neudeck, the vehicle driven by a 16-year-old minor struck
plaintiff's vehicle in an intersection collision. There was evidence
to the effect that the defendant minor had been negligent. The trial
court gave judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant minor appealed
1 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 283A (1965); PROSSER, TORTS
§ 32 (3d ed. 1964).
2 97 A.L.R.2d 872, 874 (1964).
3 233 A.C.A. 1, 43 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1965).
4 See, e.g., 97 A.L.R.2d 872 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 283A,
comment c (1965); PROSSER, TORTS § 32, at 159 (3d ed. 1964).
5 233 A.C.A. 1, 6, 43 Cal. Rptr. 250, 253 (1965).
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on the ground that the trial court erred in refusing to give defen-
dant's proposed instruction, which stated: "A child is not held to
the same standard of conduct as an adult and is only required to
exercise that degree of care which ordinarily is exercised by children
of like age, mental capacity and experience ... "I
As authority for this proposed instruction, defendant relied
upon Lehmuth v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. In Lehmuth the
minor driver of an automobile towing a sound trailer, which was not
equipped with a safety chain as required by California law, was held
not to be liable for the personal injuries sustained by pedestrians
who were struck by the trailer after it had broken loose. In ruling
that the trial court's instruction (which was substantially the
same as defendant's proposed instruction in Neudeck)8 had been
correct, the Supreme Court stated that a minor's age alone, even
though it is 18 years, does not sufficiently establish maturity such
as to impose upon him the standard of care applicable to an adult.9
However, in a concurring opinion in Lehmuth, Justice Schauer took
exception to the holding of the majority, by saying:
It is my view, however, that minors who undertake to drive motor
vehicles upon the public highways of this state should be subject to the
same rules governing operation of such vehicles and to the same
liability for breach of such rules, as are adults.' 0
Since Lehmuth, other cases in this area have conflicted over
the standard of care that is applicable to a minor driver.
In Shmatovich v. New Sonoma Creamery," considering the
issue of the alleged contributory negligence of a 17-year-old driver,
the First District Court of Appeal, relying on Lehmuth, ruled that
a minor is not to be held to the same standard of care as an adult
even where the alleged negligence of the minor occurs while in the
operation of a motor vehicle.
In Goodwin v. Bryant,2 involving the alleged primary negli-
gence of a minor driver in an intersection collision, the Fifth District
Court, citing Lehmuth, reluctantly held that the trial court's instruc-
6 1 CAL. JUR. INsr. Crv. 4th, No. 147 (1956).
7 53 Cal. 2d 544, 348 P.2d 887, 2 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1960).
8 See text accompanying note 6 supra.
9 The court in Lehmuth cites Guyer v. Sterling Laundry Co., 171 Cal. 761,
154 Pac. 1057 (1916), and Satariano v. Sleight, 54 Cal. App. 2d 278, 129 P.2d 35(1942), as authority for its holding. It should be noted that while both cases
involved the alleged negligence of minors, neither involved the operation of a motor
vehicle by a minor.
10 53 Cal. 2d 544, 557, 348 P.2d 887, 895, 2 Cal. Rptr. 279, 287 (1960).
11 187 Cal. App. 2d 342, 9 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1960).12 227 Cal. App. 2d 785, 39 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1964).
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tion applying the general standard of care required of minors had
been correctly given.
•.. the Supreme Court has specifically ruled that the instruction with
respect to a minor involved in an automobile collision is correct (Lek-
muth v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. . . .), and as an intermediate
appellate court we are bound by the foregoing rule. . . . Accordingly,
the instruction must be approved by us. 18
However, in a case decided the same month as Shmatovich,
the Second District Court of Appeal made no mention of Lehmuth
and held, relative to the alleged contributory negligence of a minor
driver, that the court need not take into consideration the great
disparity in the ages of the two drivers, "The same duty is imposed
by law on all licensed drivers and there is no distinction made as
to ages." 4
Noting the apparent conflict of these cases and the peculiar
factual situation in Lehmuth, the First District Court of Appeal in
Neudeck was presented with an opportunity to review and clarify
the law on this issue. The court acknowledged the general rule which
establishes separate standards of care for minors and adults. How-
ever, they state that an exception to this general rule arises when a
minor "engages in an activity such as driving, which is normally
undertaken by adults and for which adult qualifications are re-
quired .... ,15 When a tninor engages in such an activity he forfeits
the more limited standard of care based on his age, intelligence, and
experience and is to be held to the adult standard of a reasonable
and prudent man. The court goes on to say that such an exception
does not conflict with Lehmuth. The language in Lehmuth approving
the instruction that applied the more limited standard of care to the
defendant minor did not in fact refer to the minor's operation of
the motor vehicle, but referred only to his failure to employ the pre-
scribed safety chain.
As a basis for it's decision, the court cites with approval Dellwo
v. Pearson,'6 in which the Supreme Court of Minnesota stated:
To give legal sanction to the operation of automobiles by teen-agers
with less than ordinary care for the safety of others is impractical
today, to say .the least .... While minors are entitled to be judged by
standards commensurate with age, experience, and wisdom when
13 Id. at 794-95, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
14 Elliot v. Jensen, 187 Cal. App. 2d 389, 394, 9 Cal. Rptr. 642, 646 (1960).
15 233 A.C.A. 1, 6, 43 Cal. Rptr. 250, 253 (1965). However, the court was not
called upon to decide whether this exception extends to contributory negligence or
is limited to the issue of a minor's primary negligence. See 97 A.L.R.2d 872 (1964)
for a discussion on this issue.
16 259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d 859, 97 A.L.R.2d 866 (1961).
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